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In model checking, a counterexample is considered as a valuable tool for debugging. In Probabilistic
Model Checking (PMC), counterexample generation has a quantitative aspect. The counterexample
in PMC is a set of paths in which a path formula holds, and their accumulative probability mass
violates the probability threshold. However, understanding the counterexample is not an easy task.
In this paper we address the task of counterexample analysis for Markov Decision Processes (MDPs).
We propose an aided-diagnostic method for probabilistic counterexamples based on the notions of
causality, responsibility and blame. Given a counterexample for a Probabilistic CTL (PCTL) formula
that does not hold over an MDP model, this method guides the user to the most relevant parts of the
model that led to the violation.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) has appeared as an extension of model checking for analysing sys-
tems that exhibit stochastic behaviour. Several case studies in several domains have been addressed from
randomized distributed algorithms and network protocols to biological systems and cloud computing en-
vironments. These systems are described usually using Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC), Contin-
uous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) and Markov Decision Process (MDP), and verified against properties
specified in Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) [21] or Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL)
[8], [9].
One of the major advantages of model checking over other formal methods its ability to generate
a counterexample when the model falsifies such specification. A counterexample is an error trace, by
analyzing it, the user can locate the source of the error. Unlike the previous methods proposed for
conventional model checking that generate the counterexample as a single path ending with bad states
representing the failure, the task in PMC is quite different. The counterexample in PMC is a set of evi-
dences or diagnostic paths that satisfy the path formula and their probability mass violates the probability
bound. As it is in conventional model checking, the generated counterexample should be small and most
indicative to be easy for understanding . In PMC, this task is more challenging, since the counterex-
ample consists of multiple paths and it is probabilistic. In [6], the authors introduced a heuristic-based
search method for generating counterexamples for DTMCs and CTMCs as what they refer to as diagnos-
tic sub-graphs. In complementary work [5], they proposed an approach for counterexample generation
for MDPs based on existing methods for DTMC. Based on these works, they built an open source tool,
DiPro [4], for generating indicative counterexamples for DTMCs, CTMCs and MDPs. Similar to the
previous works, [20] has proposed the notion of smallest most indicative counterexample that reduces to
the problem of finding K shortest paths. Instead of generating path-based counterexamples, the authors
in [28] have proposed a novel approach based on critical subsystems. Following this work, [24] pro-
posed the COMICS tool for generating the critical subsystems that induce the counterexamples. Instead
of relying on the state space search resulted from the parallel composition of the modules, [29] suggests
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to rely directly on the guarded command language used by the model checker, which is more likely and
helpful for debugging purpose.
Generating small and indicative counterexamples only is not enough for understanding the error.
Therefore, in conventional model checking many works have addressed the analysis of counterexamples
to better understand the failure [18],[23],[10]. As it was done in conventional model checking, address-
ing the error explanation in probabilistic model checking is highly required, especially that probabilistic
counterexample consists of multiple paths instead of single path and it is probabilistic. Debbi [13] has
used the definition of causality [19] for debugging probabilistic models. It has been used with regression
analysis in the aim to estimate the causal effect of the Boolean variables on the violation of the prob-
abilistic property, and how these variables change their values dependently, the thing that can help to
understand the behavior of the model. The same definition of causality has also been adapted to event or-
ders for generating fault trees from probabilistic counterexamples , where the selection of traces forming
the fault tree are restricted to some minimality condition [27]. To do so, they proposed the event order
logic to reason about boolean conditions on the occurrence of events, where the cause of the hazard
in their context is presented as a Event Order Logic (EOL) formula, which is a conjunction of events,
and the event are simply actions leading from state to another. In [17], they extended their approach by
integrating causality in explicit-state model checking algorithm to give a causal interpretation for sub
and super-sets of execution traces. They proved the applicability of their approach to many industrial
size PROMELA models. They aimed to extended the causality checking approach to probabilistic coun-
terexamples by computing the probabilities of events combination [26], but they still consider the use
of causality checking of qualitative PROMELA models. They proposed a symbolic version of causality
checking [11] based on bounded model checking (BMC) and SAT solving.
In previous work [14], we have addressed the analysis of probabilistic counterexamples for DTMCs
and CTMCs using the definition of causality by Halpern and Pearl [19] and its extension, responsibility
[12]. Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a discrete time probabilistic model similar to DTMC, the only
difference is that MDP is non-deterministic through the possible actions that can be taken at each state.
Hence, for analyzing counterexamples for MDPs, we have to deal with actions as well. To this end,
we adapt the definitions of causality and responsibility to reason about causes, in addition we adapt the
definition of blame [12] to reason about actions. All the definitions are adapted in complementary way.
Following that, we introduce an algorithm for identifying the relevant parts of the model that contribute
the most to the violation of PCTL properties through computing responsibility and blame. We refer to
the output of the algorithm as diagnoses. So, compared to the work [14], this paper does not deal only
with the states and the Boolean variables that are considered as causes, but also takes in consideration
the transitions leading to them, and under which actions the transitions are enabled. With all these
information in hand, we can easily go-back to the model described in guarded command language of
PRISM model checker and locate the commands that contribute the most to the violation. In this paper
we will focus on probabilistic safety properties with upper threshold. The properties with lower threshold
can be easily transformed to properties with upper threshold [6], [20].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present some preliminaries and
definitions. In section 3, we show how the notions of causality, responsibility and blame can be adapted
for explaining probabilistic counterexamples for MDPs models, following that an algorithm is presented.
Experimental results are presented in section 4. At the end, we present conclusion and future works.
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2 Preliminaries and Definitions
Definition 2.1 (Markov Decision Process (MDP)) is a tuple M = (S,sinit ,A,P,L), where S is a finite set
of states, sinit ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of actions, P : S×A×S→ [0,1] is a probability transition
function such that for every state s ∈ S and an action α ∈ A : ∑s′∈S P(s,α,s′) ∈ {0,1}, and L : S→ 2AP
is a labeling function, which assigns to each state s ∈ S a subset of the finite set of atomic propositions
AP.
At each state s, the probability of moving to a successor state s′ by taking an action α is given by
P(s,α,s′). We say that an action α is enabled in state s if and only if ∑s′∈S P(s,α,s′) = 1, otherwise the
action α is disabled. For each state s ∈ S there is at least one action enabled. We denote the set of actions
enabled from a state s by A(s).
An infinite path σ is an infinite sequence σ = s0
α0−→ s1 α1−→ s2... with αi ∈A(si) such that P(si,αi,si+1)
> 0 for all i ≥ 0 . We define the set of infinite paths starting from a state s0 by Paths(s0). A finite path
is a finite prefix of an infinite path. We denote by FinitePaths(s0) the finite paths starting from a state
s0. For Discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), the underlying σ -algebra is formed by the cylinder sets
which are induced by FinitePaths(s0). For MDPs, computing the probabilities of paths must rely on
the resolution of non-determinism, which is performed by a scheduler. A scheduler d resolves the non-
determinism by taking in each state one of the enabled actions α ∈ A(s), thus resulting in DTMC for
which the probability of paths is measurable. We refer to the set of infinite paths under this scheduler as
Pathsd(s0). Then, the underlying σ -algebra is formed by the cylinder sets which are induced by finite
paths under this scheduler denoted FinitePathsd(s0). The probability of this cylinder set is computed by
using the following formula:
Pd(σ ∈ FinitePathsd(s0)|σ = s0 α0−→ s1 α1−→ ... αn−1−−→ sn) = ∏
i≤0<n
P(si,αi,si+1) (1)
2.1 Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL)
The Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) has appeared as an extension of CTL for the spec-
ification of systems that exhibit stochastic behaviour. PCTL state formulas are formed over the set of
atomic propositions AP according to the following grammar:
φ ::= true|a|¬φ |φ1∧φ2|P∼p(ϕ)
Where a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition, ϕ is a path formula, P is a probability threshold operator,
∼∈ {<,≤,>,≥} is a comparison operator, and p is a probability threshold. The path formulas ϕ are
formed according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::= φ1Uφ2|φ1Wφ2|φ1U≤nφ2|φ1W≤nφ2
Where φ1 and φ2 are state formulas and n∈N. The PCTL formula is a state formula, where path formulas
only occur inside the operator P.
The satisfaction of P∼p(ϕ) on DTMC depends on the probability mass of set of paths satisfying
ϕ . This set is considered as a countable union of cylinder sets, so that, its measurability is ensured. A
formula P∼p(ϕ) is satisfied on an MDP M if only if for every d ∈ D: Pd(ϕ)∼ p, where D represents the
set of all schedulers and Pd(ϕ) represents the probability of the set of all finite paths satisfying ϕ under
the scheduler d.
The semantics of PCTL state and of path formulas for MDPs are defined as the same as for DTMCs
as follows.
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s |= true⇔ true
s |= a⇔ a ∈ L(s)
s |= ¬φ ⇔ s 6|= φ
s |= φ1∧φ2⇔ s |= φ1∧ s |= φ2
Given a path s0
α0−→ s1 α1−→ ... and an integer j≥ 0, where σ [ j] = s j, the semantics of PCTL path formulas
is defined as for CTL as follows:
σ |= φ1Uφ2⇔∃ j ≥ 0.σ [ j] |= φ2∧ (∀0≤ k < j.σ [k] |= φ1)
σ |= φ1Wφ2⇔ σ |= φ1Uφ2∨ (∀k ≥ 0.σ [k] |= φ1)
σ |= φ1U≤nφ2⇔∃0≤ j ≤ n.σ [ j] |= φ2∧ (∀0≤ k < j.σ [k] |= φ1)
σ |= φ1W≤nφ2⇔ σ |= φ1U≤nφ2∨ (∀0≤ k ≤ n.σ [k] |= φ1)
We should mention that for model checking of MDPs we have to consider either maximizing or mini-
mizing scheduler. Let Pmax(ϕ) be the maximal probability of ϕ where Pmax(ϕ) =max{Pd(ϕ)|d ∈D}, and
dually the minimal probability Pmin(ϕ) be the minimal probability of ϕ where Pmin(ϕ) =min{Pd(ϕ)|d ∈
D}. For instance for properties of upper threshold , it is evident that (M 6|= P≤p(ϕ))⇔ Pmax(ϕ)> p.
2.2 Probabilistic Counterexamples
The PCTL property φ = P≤p(ϕ) is violated on an MDP, if there exists at least one scheduler d such that
the probability mass of the paths satisfying ϕ under d exceeds the bound p. A probabilistic counterex-
ample for the property φ = P≤p(ϕ) can be formed of a set of paths from FinitePathsd(s0) starting at
state s0 and satisfying the path formula ϕ such that Pmax(ϕ) > p for some scheduler d. We denote this
set by FinitePathsd(s0 |= φ). These finite paths are also called diagnostic paths [6],[5].
It is clear that given a scheduler d, it is possible to find a set of probabilistic counterexamples under d
denoted PCXd(s0 |= φ), which is a set of any combination from FinitePathsd(s0 |= φ), their probability
mass exceeds the bound p. Among all these probabilistic counterexamples, we are interested by the most
indicative one. A most indicative counterexample is a minimal counterexample (has the least number
of paths from FinitePathsd(s0 |= φ)) and its probability mass is the highest among all other minimal
counterexamples. We denote a most indicative probabilistic counterexample by MIPCXd(s0 |= φ). We
should mention that a most indicative probabilistic counterexample may not be unique.
Lemma 2.1 For every path σ ∈MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) on which the property φ1Uφ2(φ1U≤nφ2) is satisfied,
the right state sub-formula (φ2) is satisfied in the last state of σ .
Example 1 Let us consider the example of MDP shown in Figure 1 and the property P≤0.5(ϕ), where
ϕ = (a∨b)U(c∧d).
This property is violated in this model (s0 6|= P≤0.5(ϕ)), since there exists a scheduler d (of α-actions)
that induces a set of finite paths satisfying ϕ and their probability mass is greater than the probability
bound (0.5). Any combination from FinitePathsd(s0 |= φ) having probability mass greater than 0.5, is a
valid probabilistic counterexample including the whole set. Let us take the following counterexamples:
P(CX1) = P({s0 α0−→ s1 α1−→ s7,s0 α0−→ s2 α2−→ s3,s0 α0−→ s2 α2−→ s4 α4−→ s3,s0 α0−→ s2 α2−→ s4 α4−→ s5,s0 α0−→ s4 α4−→ s5
})
= 0.25+0.2+0.09+0.15+0.12 = 0.81
P(CX2) = P({s0 α0−→ s1 α1−→ s7,s0 α0−→ s2 α2−→ s4 α4−→ s5,s0 α0−→ s4 α4−→ s5})
= 0.25+0.15+0.12 = 0.52
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Figure 1: An Example for an MDP
P(CX3) = P({s0 α0−→ s1 α1−→ s7,s0 α0−→ s2 α2−→ s3,s0 α0−→ s2 α2−→ s4 α4−→ s5})
= 0.25+0.2+0.15 = 0.60
The last probabilistic counterexample CX3 is most indicative since it is minimal and its probability is
greater than the other minimal counterexample CX2.
3 Generating Diagnoses for MDPs
3.1 Causality and Responsibility for MIPCXd(s0 |= φ)
As the same as for DTMCs, explaining the violation of PCTL properties of the form φ = P≤p(ϕ) for
MDPs reduces to the explanation of exceeding the probability bound over the MDP model. MDP is a
discrete time probabilistic model similar to DTMC. Therefore, the definitions of causality and responsi-
bility can be adapted for MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) in the same way they have been adapted for counterexamples
of DTMCs [14].
Definition 3.1 (Causality Model) A causality model for a most indicative probabilistic counterexample
MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) is a tuple M = (U,V,F), where the set U is represented by a context variable; its value
u represents a state s. V is a set of atomic propositions and Boolean formulas. F associates with every
variable Vi ∈V a truth function fVi that determines the value of Vi (0 or 1), given a state s and the values
of other variables in V .
Let us denote by ̂MIPCXd(s,X ← x′)(s0 |= φ) the set of finite paths resulted from MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) by
switching the value of a variable X ∈V in a state s.
Definition 3.2 (Criticality) Consider a counterexample MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) for a probabilistic formula
φ = P≤p(ϕ), a state s in MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) and a variable X ∈V that has a value x ∈ {0,1} in s. We say
that a pair (s,X = x) is critical for the violation of φ = P≤p(ϕ), if ̂MIPCXd(s,X ← x′)(s0 |= φ) is not a
valid counterexample for φ = P≤p(ϕ).
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Definition 3.3 (Actual Cause) Consider a counterexample MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) for a probabilistic formula
φ = P≤p(ϕ) and a variable X ∈ V . We say that (s,X = x) is a cause for the violation of φ = P≤p(ϕ),
if (s,X = x) is critical , or there exists a subset of variables W of V such that switching their values in s
makes (s,X = x) critical.
Thus, in our setting, we can refer to a cause as a pair (s,X = x) where X is an atomic proposition has
the value 1 in s if X ∈ L(s), and it has the value 0 otherwise. (s,X = x) is said to be cause, if it is critical,
or it can be made critical by switching the values of a set of variables W in s.
Definition 3.4 (Responsibility)Consider a counterexample MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) for a probabilistic formula
φ = P≤p(ϕ) and a variable X ∈V . The degree of responsibility of a cause (s,X = x) for the violation of
φ = P≤p(ϕ) denoted dR(s,X = x,φ)is 1 if (s,X = x) is critical, and otherwise is 1/(|W |+1).
That is, we can think of responsibility as a quantitative measure that gives us diagnostic informa-
tion on (s,X = x) being a cause for the violation of φ = P≤p(ϕ) , where the cause having the highest
responsibility for the violation is the critical one.
Definition 3.5 (Probabilistic Causality Model) A probabilistic causality model for MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) is
a tuple (M,Pr), where M is the causality model and Pr is a probability function defined over the states
of MIPCXd(s0 |= φ). We define for each state s from MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) its probability as follows:
Pr(s) = ∑
σ∈MIPCXd(s0|=φ)|s∈σ
P(σ) (2)
Since every variable in V is a function of U , we can define the probability of each cause (s,X = x) in
the same way:
Pr(s,X = x) = Pr(s) (3)
Definition 3.6 (Most Responsible Cause) A cause C is a most responsible cause for the violation of
φ = P≤p(ϕ), if dR(C)Pr(C)≥ dR(C′)Pr(C′) for any cause C′.
3.2 Blame for MIPCXd(s0 |= φ)
MDPs are non-deterministic Markov models through the possible actions that can be taken at each state,
where each action enables a set of transitions. In probabilistic guarded command language of probabilis-
tic model checker like PRISM, transitions represent updates on the variables with probabilities assigned
to them. Therefore, for complete analysis of probabilistic counterexamples for MDPs, we have also
to deal with actions. As a result, we should ask: how does an action α contribute to the violation of
φ = P≤p(ϕ)? which leads to the question, which action should be more blamed for exceeding the prob-
ability threshold p. Hence, the designer would not need just to be aware of probable false assignments,
but he also needs to know how such actions are involved. Given this information, the designer could fix
the guard commands in way he gets the acceptable outcome. We should mention that blame considers
mainly whether an action α is to blame for an outcome ϕ under uncertainty [12].
Consider a state s in MIPCXd(s0 |= φ). For each action α ∈ A(s), we denote by Suc(s,α) the set of
α-successors of s, where α-successor is a state s′ ∈ S such that P(s,α,s′) > 0. We associate for each
transition from s to s′, where s′ ∈ Suc(s,α) a probability as follow
PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′) = ∑
σ∈MIPCXd(s0|=φ)|(s,α,s′)∈σ
P(σ) (4)
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It is evident that not every transition enabled by an action α has the same presence in the paths forming
the counterexample. So this probability measures simply the contribution of a transition to the probability
of the counterexample by summing the probabilities of the paths in which it is included.
Proposition 3.1 Consider a transition (s,α,s′) in MIPCXd(s0 |= φ), Max(PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′)) = Pr(s)
iff s′ is the unique successor of s.
Proof Pr(s) represents the sum of probabilities of paths in which s is included, PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′))
represents the probabilities of the paths in which the transition is included, so it is sufficient to prove that
both of them are included in the same set of paths, if only if s′ is the unique successor of s. Let s′ and s′′
two successors of s, if s is included in N paths, the transition (s,s′′) will be included at least in one path
from this set, and thus s′ will be included at most in N− 1 of paths. Hence, Max(PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′))
will not equal to Pr(s) if there is another successor s′′ of s.
We should mention that every transition in a probabilistic program describes how the values of the
variables evolve over time, and thus considering the transitions and their contribution to the error is very
important as debugging information, which makes it a required measure for the definition of blame.
Definition 3.7 (Blame) Consider a counterexample MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) for a probabilistic formula φ =
P≤p(ϕ) , a state s, an action α ∈ A(s) and a set of successors Suc(s,α). The degree of blame for an
action α for the violation of φ = P≤p(ϕ) in a state s denoted dB(s,α,φ) is
∑
s′∈Suc(s,α)
dR(s′,X = x,φ)PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′) (5)
That is, the degree of blame dB informs us about the contribution of an action α in a state s to the violation
of the probabilistic formula φ = P≤p(ϕ). While responsibility stands as a criticality measure for actual
causes given well-defined states for the violation of φ = P≤p(ϕ), dB describes how an action should
be blamed for this violation through considering the probabilities assigned to the transitions leading to
these states. So that, the action more blamed for the violation will be the one more contributing to the
probability of MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) and leading to more critical states.
Definition 3.8 (Most Blame) An action α ∈ A(s) has most blame for the violation of PCTL property
φ = P≤p(ϕ), if dB(s,α,φ)≥ dB(s′,α ′,φ) for any s′ and any α ′ ∈ A(s′).
Proposition 3.2 Let α ∈A(s) , Max(dB(s,α,φ))=P(MIPCXd(s0 |= φ)) iff for every σ ∈MIPCXd(s0 |=
φ) there exists (s,α,s′) ∈ σ , such that s′ is critical with respect to such variable X.
That is, the maximum degree of blame of an action α in a state s is equal to the probability of the
counterexample, if only if for every path σ of the counterexample, there exists a transition from s to a
state s′ under this action, and s′ is critical with respect to such variable X .
Theorem 3.1 Let α ∈ A(s) and s′ ∈ Suc(s,α), (s′,X = x) is most responsible cause ; α has the most
blame.
Proof. Let s1 and s2 be two states, α1 and α2 two actions enabled at these states respectively. Let α1 leads
to a most responsible cause C and we assume that dB(s1,α1,φ) ≥ dB(s2,α2,φ) . Then, for every cause
C′, α2 leads to, dR(C′)Pr(C′)< dR(C)Pr(C). Let C be the unique cause α1 it leads to, let Pr(s2)>Pr(s1)
and let all the causes that α1 and α2 lead to are critical. With respect to Proposition 3.1, the probability
of the transition leading to C′ is Pr(s1), and thus with respect to the definition of blame, dB(s1,α1,φ)
will be at most Pr(s1), which is less than Pr(s2), and since the causes that α2 leads to are critical, it
contradicts α1 being the action with the most blame.
32 Debugging of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) Models
3.3 Algorithm for Generating Diagnoses
This algorithm performs on counterexamples generated by DiPro [4]. DiPro is a tool used for generating
counterexamples from DTMCs, CTMCs and MDPs models, and can be jointly used with the probabilistic
model checkers PRISM [22] and MRMC [25].
Algorithm 1 . Generate Diagnoses
1: Inputs: The counterexample MIPCXd(s0 |= φ), The probabilistic formula φ = P≤p(ϕ) where ϕ is
of the form φ1Uφ2 or (φ1U≤nφ2)
2: Outputs: Causes with responsibilities and probabilities
3: Actions with blame
4:
5: Causes := /0
6: Actions := /0
7: for each state s in MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) do
8: W:= 0
9: if s is the last state in a path σ then
10: Causes with dR:= Causes ∪ FINDCAUSES(s,φ2, W )
11: Pr(Causes)=∑σ∈MIPCXd(s0|=φ)|s∈σ P(σ)
12: else
13: Causes with dR:= Causes ∪ FINDCAUSES(s,φ1, W )
14: Pr(Causes)=∑σ∈MIPCXd(s0|=φ)|s∈σ P(σ)
15: PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′) = ∑σ∈MIPCXd(s0|=φ)|(s,α,s′)∈σ P(σ)
16: end if
17: end for
18: for each s in MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) do
19: Actions with dB:= Order(Actions ∪ α ∈ A(s), dB(s,α,φ1) = ∑s′∈Suc(s,α) dR(s′,X =
20: x,φ1)P
MIPCXd(s0|=φ)
α (s,s′))
21: end for
22: OUTPUTDIAGNOSES(Causes with dR and Pr, Actions with dB)
The algorithm 1 (Generate Diagnoses) explores the counterexample and computes the causes with
their responsibilities and probabilities with respect to each state s, and computes the degree of blame for
each action enabled at this state. The condition put on last state follows Lemma 2.1. Algorithm 1 uses
the function FindCauses that takes a state and a state formula as input as well as the variable W , and
returns recursively the set of causes and their responsibilities, where the variable W is used to compute
responsibility [14].
Computing the set of causes exactly in binary causal models is NP-complete in general[15]. However,
[16] shows that causes can be computed in polynomial time if the causal graph forms a directed causal
tree. Our algorithm is linear in the size of MIPCXd(s0 |= φ) and the size of ϕ as it has been presented
in [14], because reconfiguring the algorithm to compute the degree of blame by adding the loop in line
18 does not bring additional complexity since it is directly based on measures already computed, which
are the degree of responsibility of each cause and the probability of each transition PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′).
Computing PMIPCXd(s0|=φ)α (s,s′) (line 15) is performed under the same loop for computing the probabili-
ties of causes (line 14).
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function FINDCAUSES(s, ψ , W )
2: if ψ is of the form a where a ∈ AP and a ∈ L(s) then
return (〈s,a〉,dR(〈s,a〉) = 1/(W +1))
4: end if
if ψ is of the form ¬a where a ∈ APand a /∈ L(s) then
6: return (〈s,¬a〉,dR(〈s,¬a〉) = 1/(W +1))
end if
8: if ψ is of the form ψ1∧ψ2 then
return FindCauses(s, ψ1, W ) ∪
10: FindCauses(s, ψ2, W )
end if
12: if ψ is of the form ψ1∨ψ2 then
if s |= ψ1 and s |= ψ2 then
14: return FindCauses(s, ψ1, W ++) ∪
FindCauses(s, ψ2, W ++)
16: if s |= ψ1∧ s 6|= ψ2 then
return FindCauses(s, ψ1, W )
18: end if
if s 6|= ψ1∧ s |= ψ2 then
20: return FindCauses(s, ψ2, W )
end if
22: end if
end if
24: end function
function OUTPUTDIAGNOSES(Causes with dR and Pr, Actions with dB)
for each actionα ∈ A(s) from Actions do
3: Output (α)
for each a successor s′ ∈ Suc(s,α) do
Output Causes Ordered with respect to dR×Pr
6: Output (s,s′)
end for
end for
9: end function
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At the end we present the function OUTPUTDIAGNOSES that shows the way of presenting the
diagnoses to te user. It gets the actions ordered with respect to dB, and the causes with dR and Pr and
outputs the diagnoses in order. We see that the output of the diagnoses starts with the action with the most
blame, and among all the causes it leads to, we begin by the most responsible cause, by indicating also
the transition leading to this cause. Presenting the transition enabled under this action is very important
as a diagnostic information, because transitions in typical probabilistic program describe how the values
of the variables evolve over time.
Example 2
Let us apply this algorithm on the counterexample CX3 from the previous example. The user gets the
action α0 first, since dB(s0,α0,φ)= 0.6 is the highest, it is equal to the probability of the counterexample.
From Suc(s0,α), the user gets first the cause (s2,b) because it is the most responsible by computing the
measure Pr(s2,b)× dR(s2,b) = 0.58 > Pr(s1,a)× dR(s1,a,φ) = 0.41. The following action the user
gets is α2 with degree of blame dB(s2,α2,φ) = 0.5× (0.15)+ 1× (0.2) = 0.275 with the causes it led
to {(s3,c),(s3,d)} and {(s4,a)},{(s4,b)} respectively, then α1 with dB(s1,α1) = 0.25 with the cause
it led to {(s7,c),(s7,d)}, and finally the action α4 with dB(s4,α4,φ) = 0.15 with the cause it led to
{(s5,c),(s5,d)}.
4 Experiments
We have implemented the above method in Java. We used two benchmark case studies to evaluate our
method, the Zeroconf protocol [2] and CSMA/CD protocol [1]. All the experiments were carried out on
windows XP with Intel Pentium CPU 3.2 GHz speed And 2 GB of memory. We sue DiPro for generating
the counterexamples. DiPro employs many algorithms for generating counterexamples, among these
algorithms we use the K* algorithm [7]. Our method takes the counterexample generated from DiPro
and the property to be verified as input, and outputs the diagnoses.
4.1 Zeroconf
The protocol is modeled in PRISM as an MDP, where the number of abstract hosts is denoted by N, the
number of probes to send is denoted by K, and the probability of message loss is denoted by loss. Each
station has a single-message buffer and is cyclically attended by the server. The buffer could store the
messages that it wants to send, in such cases, messages are not relevant after reconfiguring, and thus
keeping these messages can slow down the network and making hosts reconfigure when they do not
need to. We therefore considered two different versions of the network: one where the host does not do
anything about these messages (No Reset) and the another where the host deletes these messages when
it decides to choose a new IP address (Reset).
We chose the property that measures the probability of not choosing a fresh address by time T. This
property is given in PRISM as follows:
Pmax =?[!(l = 4∧ ip = 2)U(t > T )]
We test this property using PRISM for both types of network (Reset) and (No Reset) for the following
values (T = 10; N = 1000;loss = 0.1 and K could vary from 4 to 8). For these values, PRISM renders
a probability greater than 0.5. As a result, we chose the value 0.5 as a threshold. The property can be
rewritten as follows:
P≤ 0.5[!(l = 4∧ ip = 2)U(t > T )]
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Table 1: PRISM results for Zeroconf
Reset K states transitions
true 4 9683 15727
6 7743 11401
8 7743 11401
false 4 59076 121265
6 58937 120525
8 58937 120525
The PRISM results are shown in Table 1. We notice that the size of the models is very huge with
(No Reset), comparing to (Reset). Despite that, DiPro renders the same counterexample for all these dif-
ferent configurations with the same execution time. For generating the counterexample, DiPro Explored
24 traces resulting in 121 vertices and 150 edges in 5 seconds for all the configurations. Finally, the
counterexample rendered by DiPro consists just of 8 diagnostic paths.
We pass this counterexample to our algorithm for generating the diagnoses. Our algorithm takes less
than 1 second as execution time. The causes generated for this property are as follows: for the right sub-
formula, the cause generated is singleton C0= (t > T ). For the left sub-formula, the set of causes for not
choosing a fresh address: C1=!(l = 4) and C2=!(ip= 2). Notice that we are facing disjunctive scenario
here, which means that either C1 (address not in use) is the actual cause or C2 (not fresh address) or both
of them. Our results show that except the initial state where ip = 1 (IP address of an abstract host which
the concrete host is currently trying to configure), the actual cause for not choosing fresh address within
10 time units is C1, which means that we reach states in which there is fresh ip which the concrete host
is currently trying to configure but without being used. The number of states from 8 diagnostic paths in
which we found theses causes are estimated to be 59 states, this is much less than the states of the model
(9683).
Concerning the actions and their blame, in the model we have two main actions causing the non-
determinism in such states, which are: ’Reconfigure’ denoted rec and ’defend’ which is performed by
sending an ARP packet and thus this action is denoted in the model by send. For the counterexample
generated given the previous property, our results show that there is no state in which the host reconfig-
ures, which means that the only action we are dealing with is send. As a result, we compute the dB of
send action in such states. We found that it has the same degree of blame (dB = 0.25) in each state it is
enabled.
4.2 CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense, Multiple Access with Collision Detection)
CSMA/CD is a protocol for carrier transmission access in Ethernet networks that avoids collision (min-
imizing simultaneous use of the channel) when Network Interface Card (NIC) tries to send its packet.
The protocol is modeled as a probabilistic timed automata (PTA) [1] and can be reduced to an MDP in
order to be analyzed against probabilistic properties by PRISM. The model in PRISM consists of three
main components or modules, the two senders namely station 1 and station 2 respectively and the third
component is the bus or the medium. The protocol functionality is as follows: if a station has a data to
send, it listens first to the medium, in case it is free, the stations send the data, otherwise (bus is busy), it
repeats the process after random amount of time. If there is a collision the station attempts to retransmit
the packet where the scheduling of the retransmission is determined by a truncated binary exponential
backoff process. The complete model is available in the PRISM benchmark suite under MDPs section
[3].
We chose the property that estimates the maximum probability of all stations sending successfully
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Table 2: PRISM Results
K States Transitions
2 1083 1282
4 7958 10594
Table 3: DiPro Results
K States Transitions Time Construction (Sec) Diagnostic Paths
2 1037 1276 6 sec 134
4 4222 5201 16 sec 324
before a collision with max backoff. This property is given as follows:
Pmax =?[!”collision max backo f f ”U”all delivered”]
We tested this property using PRISM for the following values: N=2 and K=2, N=2 and K=4 respec-
tively, where N represents the number of stations and K represents the exponential backoff limit. For
these values, PRISM renders a probability greater than 0.7. As a result, we chose the value 0.7 as a
threshold. The property can be rewritten as follows:
P≤ 0.7[!”collision max backo f f ”U”all delivered”]
Where collision max backo f f and all delivered are defined as follows: collision max backo f f
= (cd1=K&s1= 1&b= 2)|(cd2=K&s2= 1&b= 2), all delivered = (s1= 4&s2= 4) . The variables
cd1 and cd2 refer to collision counters for both stations where K represents the backoff limit , s1 and s2
refer to the state of the stations where s1 = 1,s2 = 1 indicate that the stations are transmitting data, and
finally b refers to the state of the bus where b = 2 indicates that there is a collision.
Table 2 shows the size of the model by PRISM. Table 3 shows the states and transition explored
while searching for the counterexample and the time required for its construction by DiPro. We notice
that DiPro nearly explored all the model to generate the counterexample for K=2, whereas for K=4,
DiPro explores nearly half of the model. For k=2, the counterexample generated consists of 134 diag-
nostic paths, and for k=4 the counterexample generated consists of 324 diagnostic paths. We pass both
counterexamples to our algorithm for generating the diagnoses.
Table 4 shows the execution results of our algorithm. The second column represents the number of
causes generated from the counterexample with respect to the states, while the third column shows the
number of classes of causes probabilities. The results show that the time taken for computing the causes
is less than the time taken for generating the counterexample.
The causes generated for this property are as follows: For the right sub-formula, the cause generated
is a conjunct C0 = (s1 = 4&s2 = 4). For the left sub-formula, the set of causes for not facing a collision
with max backoff are: C1 = ¬(cd1 = K), C2 = ¬(s1 = 1), C3 = ¬(b = 2),C4 = ¬(cd2 = K) C5 =
¬(s2 = 1). For both values of K, our results show that there are causes that share the same probability,
as we mentioned before that most responsible cause may not be unique. In addition, for both values of
Table 4: Execution results of our algorithm
K Causes Causes Probabilities Execution Time (Sec)
2 616 98 3 sec
4 923 47 8 sec
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K, the most responsible causes are the same. Among all the causes, we found that the most responsible
causes for not facing collision are C1 and C4, where the states in which these causes are found have the
highest probability.
Concerning the actions and their blame, we found that send1 and send2 have the most blame, where
send1 and send2 lead to the most responsible causes C1 and C4. For send1, the first transition that it
enables is represented by the valuations b = 1 (bus active) and s1 = 1 (station 1 is transmitting). Given
these information we will be able to identify the commands that contributed the most to the violation,
which are [send1](b = 0)− > (b′ = 1) (line 35) in the bus module from a side, and from the side of
station, the command is [send1](s1 = 0)− > (s1′ = 1)&(x1′ = 0) (line 82). For send2, the first transi-
tion that it enables is represented by the valuations b = 2 (bus busy - collision) and s2 = 1 (station 2 is
transmitting). Given these information we will be able to identify the commands, which are [send2](b =
1|b = 2)&(y2 < sigma)− > (b′ = 2) (line 40) in the bus module from a side, and from the side of sta-
tion, the command is [send2](s2 = 0)− > (s2′ = 1)&(x2′ = 0) (line 82). Then, based on the second
transition enabled by send2, which is represented by the valuations b= 1 (bus active) and s2= 1 (station
2 is transmitting) and leads to a critical state, the commands to check are [send2](b = 0)− > (b′ = 1)
(line 36) in the bus module, and [send2](s2 = 3)&(x2 = slot)&(bc2 = 0)−> (s2′ = 1)&(x2′ = 0) (line
99) in the station module respectively. Finally, based on the second transition enabled by send1, which
is represented by the valuations b = 2 (bus busy - collision) and s1 = 1 (station 1 is transmitting), the
commands to check are: [send1](b = 1|b = 2)&(y1 < sigma)− > (b′ = 2) (line 39)in the bus module,
and [send1](s1 = 3)&(x1 = slot)&(bc1 = 0)− > (s1′ = 1)&(x1′ = 0) (line 99) in the station module
respectively. The other states in which C1 and C4 are not the causes, we find that C3 is the most re-
sponsible cause. So by defining the transition leading to it, and under which action is enabled, we could
also map to the commands related and analyze the rest of the model driven by the diagnoses. So as we
see, given the diagnoses generated by our algorithm, it would be easy to go-back to the model, which
is given in PRISM guarded command language, and identify the commands that contributed the most
to the violation of the probability threshold. By performing some changes on these commands in order,
the probability as estimated by PRISM goes below the probability threshold, and thus the probabilistic
property will be satisfied.
In general, the results presented here report that our method has a good execution time and thus it
can be adapted in practice. Comparing to the execution time taken for generating the counterexample,
the execution time of our method is remarkably lower. Concerning the number of diagnoses generated,
our method outputs low number of causes comparing to the size of the model, in addition our method
outputs the most responsible causes first to the user, which could help the user to find the source of the
error rapidly without reading all the causes generated. Along the results, we found that many causes
could share the same probability, which means that many causes are found in the same set of paths of the
counterexample, this could mean that there is such dependence between variables where the values are
changing together. This information is very important for debugging, because it could help user even to
locate the line responsible for error in the model itself given the action leading to it. Concerning actions
we notice that such actions from the model might be ignored since they do not exist under the scheduler
resolving the non-determinism, for instance for Zerconf protocol, we found the only action to be analyzed
is send, the action reconfigure is not concerned, and that means that the search space is limited. It is
evident that relaying on small number of actions also facilitates the debugging. Concerning the structure
of the probabilistic property to be analyzed, our method has more importance when we face a disjunctive
scenario, because in disjunctive scenario we can not be sure about the variables causing the violation,
and here where responsibility measure plays the major role. Finally, the commands as identified in the
PRISM modules with respect to the diagnoses generated do not necessarily follow the same order in the
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module, for instance the command [send2](b = 1|b = 2)&(y2 < sigma)−> (b′ = 2) (line 40) has been
reported before the command [send2](b = 0)− > (b′ = 1) (line 36). We also notice that we were able
to deal with the parallel composition of the modules, for instance [send1](b = 0)−> (b′ = 1) in the bus
module and [send1](s1 = 0)−> (s1′ = 1)&(x1′ = 0) in the station module.
5 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper we have shown how the notions of causality, responsibility and blame can be useful in the
context of probabilistic counterexamples of MDPs. Due to the probabilistic nature of the causality model,
we introduced the definition of most responsible cause and the action with most blame. We showed that
delivering the causes/actions with respect to their responsibilities/blame stands as a good debugging
method that guides the user through large counterexamples, and thus it could help us to identify the
commands responsible for the violation of the probabilistic formula.
As future works, we plan to deliver a debugging tool that generates the diagnoses graphically for all
kinds of Markov models. Furthermore, we aim to integrate our method in the model checking process
itself, in order to locate the commands in PRISM code directly without depending on the counterexample
generated.
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